

FUELING ETHNIC CLEANSING IN DARFUR

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“This is the best kind of partner you can ask for,” Mutrif Sideeq said to reporters last November regarding his country’s relationship with China.² An official in Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sideeq is understandably grateful. Since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1959, China has enjoyed increasingly friendly relations with Africa’s largest country, expressed through frequent diplomatic visits, academic exchanges, military cooperation and growth of trade.³ China’s overtures towards Sudan, stepped up in recent years, are in concert with a grander courtship of Africa.⁴ But while wealth creation by the Chinese in Africa has benefited Africans in many ways, malignant effects are also apparent—and nowhere more so than in the Darfur region. China’s growing investment in Sudan’s rich oil reserves is paired with a tacit agreement that Beijing will not use its clout to press Sudan on human rights abuses. Recently, this has meant strong opposition by China to any United Nations action to end the government-backed ethnic cleansing in Darfur. China’s support has emboldened Sudan and undermined international efforts to stop the continuing atrocities in Darfur. As Sudan has become a pariah state whose name is associated immediately with ethnic cleansing and genocide, officials such as Mutrif Sideeq have come to appreciate the partnership offered by an emerging world power such as China.

As the world now knows, Darfurians are being massacred by the *janjaweed*, government-sponsored ethnic militias that have been committing war crimes, crimes against humanity and “ethnic cleansing” in the Darfur region since February 2003. Current UN estimates indicate that there are at least 180,000 dead and more than 2.5 million displaced persons in the region,⁵ with countless others raped and assaulted. Perpetrating their violence in the context of a military counter-insurgency campaign against two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), government forces and militias have systematically targeted civilian communities that share the same ethnicity as the rebels. In response to the government’s atrocities, the rebel groups have abducted civilians, attacked police stations and other government institutions, and raided and looted livestock and commercial goods.

In 2004, the UN Security Council passed three resolutions intimating measures against Sudan’s government if it does not

disarm and prosecute those responsible for abuses in Darfur.⁶ Because they lack any intent of strong action, these resolutions have had little effect in restraining the Sudanese government or its allied militias, or in improving security and protection for civilians. In February this year, victims interviewed by Human Rights Watch in Darfur reported rapes, torture and mutilation by government-backed militias. Eyewitnesses told how government-backed militias attacked villages in South Darfur, singling out young women and girls for rape. Male relatives who protested were beaten, stripped naked, tied to trees and forced to watch the rapes. Moreover, in violation of an April ceasefire agreement and a November commitment to cease aerial activity in Darfur, the Sudanese government used aircraft in mid-December to attack the civilian population of South Darfur.⁷

In March of this year, the UN passed three new resolutions on Darfur that may offer some belated and limited relief.⁸ Passed after key objectors withheld their vetoes, these resolutions will: 1) deploy 10,000 UN peacekeepers to Sudan, but under a limited mandate that does not yet include operations in Darfur; 2) attempt to impose sanctions on government officials found to violating international humanitarian and human rights law; and 3) aim to try cases at the International Criminal Court (ICC). The UN’s efforts to toughen its stance on Darfur have been restrained and delayed by China’s repeated threats to use its Security Council veto. As a member of the UN, China has a responsibility to oppose ethnic cleansing and take steps to end it, and given its intimate connections with Khartoum, Sudan’s capital, Beijing could use its influence to curtail the carnage and bolster its image as a responsible global power.

Thirst for oil

While China’s investment and involvement in Africa dates back to 1959, its growing thirst for oil has ratcheted up its interest in recent years. Only a little over a decade ago, China was a net exporter of oil, but the country’s rapid development has changed that picture radically. China now imports 40 percent of its crude to keep up with its gross domestic product (GDP) growth, which was 8.1 percent in 2004 and has averaged 9 percent over the last two decades.⁹ Although a slightly decreased GDP expansion rate of 7.8 percent is anticipated for 2005, China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) estimates that China’s demand for oil will see a 19 percent year-on-year

increase by the end of 2004.¹⁰ China now accounts for 12.1 percent of the world's oil consumption, surpassing Japan to take second place behind the United States. It is responsible for 40 percent of the increase in worldwide oil demand over the last four years. In five years, the number of vehicles traversing China's roads is expected to double to 56 million.¹¹ The U.S. Energy Department predicts that by 2025, China will import 9.4 million barrels per day (bpd) out of a total consumption of 12.8 million bpd.¹²

In contrast to its mushrooming energy consumption, domestic oil output from Chinese reserves in Daqing and Liaohe is diminishing, and even with today's high oil prices, reserves in China's western deserts are too costly to pump and transport. As a result, China began a campaign in the late 1990s to exponentially increase its overseas production and secure foreign resources for the future of its economic colossus.

Many Western oil companies avoid dictatorial and unstable states such as Sudan, concerned about volatile conditions there and condemnation at home.¹³ Others are prevented from operating in certain countries by sanctions such as those imposed by the U.S. on Sudan. Companies from China, India and Malaysia face no such pressure, and without major competition from the West, they are buying up Sudan's oil reserves.

Thinking ahead

Determined to secure reliable supplies of energy, China aims to lock up oil at its sources, a strategy that funds exploration and development in oil-rich countries that require outside assistance to make full use of their natural wealth.¹⁴ China is able to cement its relationship with these countries by providing capital and technology, and assisting in the construction of infrastructure. Although the search has taken Chinese officials around the world, from neighboring Russia and Kazakhstan to traditional U.S. suppliers such as Canada,¹⁵ Venezuela¹⁶ and Saudi Arabia,¹⁷ their investments in Africa are considered the most enduring for national energy security. Sudan currently exports 60 percent of its oil to China, making it a key piece of China's Africa strategy.

Sudan is desirable for several reasons. Current oil production is estimated at a fraction of proven reserves, and will continue to expand with the aid of foreign investors. Since it does not belong to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Sudan is not subject to its production or export limits.¹⁸ Furthermore, Sudanese oil is low in sulfur and of a similar grade to China's domestic product, making it easier to refine at home.¹⁹ Finally, by cooperating with and supporting Sudan while it is considered a rogue state, China has been able



Displaced Sudanese in a Darfur refugee camp. Photo: Reuters

to exploit a lack of competition. In 2001, Beijing selected Sudan as the “springboard for its campaign to triple its overseas oil production within four years.”²⁰

According to the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, oil cooperation with Sudan began in 1995, and production began in June 1999.²¹ On December 6, 1996, CNPC, a government-owned corporation, acquired the largest share (40 percent) in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC)²² when Canada’s Arakis Energy Corporation sold 75 percent of its interest in the project.²³ CNPC, through its construction subsidiary, China Petroleum Engineering & Construction (Group) Corporation (CPECC), then assisted in the building of a 1,540-kilometer pipeline from blocks 1 and 2 to the Red Sea.²⁴ The Chinese government lauded the Sudan project as “the first overseas large oilfield operated by China.”²⁵

Next, the two countries jointly built a refinery near Khartoum with a 2.5 million ton processing capacity that went into operation in May 2000.²⁶ To cover its bases, CNPC deftly crafted the refinery contract to secure an important concession: if debt service on this project is not met, CNPC has the right to extract the equivalent of crude oil in kind, depriving Sudan of its own fuel to refine.²⁷

Because investors are planning for the long-term, they have been willing to forego immediate profits on these projects. CPECC vice president Wang Guoqing told a reporter, “A Western company couldn’t have done what we did . . . Sudan wanted it done in 18 months and we did it, even though we knew we wouldn’t make any money.”²⁸ Wang said CPECC also brought in 10,000 Chinese workers to finish the GNPOC project in record time: “Our workers are used to eating bitterness . . . they can work 13–14 hours a day for very little.”²⁹

With three billion U.S. dollars invested in Sudan, China’s work there is only beginning. Trial production at Block 6 in the western Kordofan region began in the summer of 2004, while blocks 3 and 7 are under construction and will begin production in approximately six months. Chinese state-run interests hold 47 percent of these two blocks, split between CNPC (41 percent) and Sinopec (6 percent).³⁰ A new pipeline, extending 730 kilometers from the Al-Fulah area in western Sudan to a refinery in the Khartoum suburbs, is currently under construction.³¹ As Li Xiaobing, the deputy director of the Trade Ministry’s West Asian and African Affairs division, said in a press interview, “When we started [in Sudan], they were an oil importer, and now they are an oil exporter. We’ve built refineries, pipelines and production.”³²

Thanks in part to foreign investors led by the Chinese, oil now accounts for more than 11 percent of Sudan’s GDP.³³ Oil and petroleum products total 81 percent of exports and 40 percent of public revenue.³⁴ As today’s high oil prices make exploration more worthwhile, Sudan’s estimated reserves have been growing. Amnesty International reports that proven reserves were estimated at 564 million barrels as of January 2003.³⁵ China’s long-term plans for Sudan may prove disappointing, however. Estimates place production at 500,000 bpd by the end of 2005, which means that Sudan’s oil will be gone in approximately three years unless significant new reserves are discovered. Arvind Ganesan, a director at Human Rights



Chinese Ambassador to the UN Wang Guangya speaks after China abstained from a Security Council vote in September 2004 threatening sanctions against Sudan. Photo: Reuters

Watch, describes China’s involvement as “looking the other way on serious human rights issues for a relatively short-lived gain.”³⁶

Arming the Sudanese regime

China’s involvement in Sudan has not only bolstered the Sudanese economy—it has also provided military aid that enables a repressive regime to torture and kill its own citizens. International Monetary Fund (IMF) figures show a steady increase in Sudan’s military spending, including equipment used against civilians in Darfur. In late 2004, it was revealed that China is one of Sudan’s main suppliers of arms, military planes and helicopters, all equipment used regularly in air and land attacks against civilians. Since the 1990s, China has provided Sudan with more than 40 Shenyang J-6 and J-7 jet fighters and F-7 supersonic fighters, and some of these weapons have been used by government-backed militias in Darfur.³⁷ According to a report cited by Amnesty International, Sudan imported \$32,827 worth of pistols and revolvers, \$97,437 of ‘sporting and hunting shotguns’ and \$845,918 worth of ‘parts and accessories for shotguns or rifles’ from China in 2002.³⁸ Furthermore, China provides equipment

such as trucks and logistical equipment which, while less closely monitored, is also used in Sudan's systematic abuse of human rights.³⁹ China also reportedly assisted the Sudanese government in setting up three weapons factories near Khartoum.⁴⁰ With the seventh largest military expenditure in Africa, the Sudanese government seems well equipped for protracted warfare against Darfurian civilians.

According to the U.S.-funded Civilian Protection Monitoring Team, Chinese interest encouraged the Sudanese government "to clear the way for oil exploration and to create a *cordon sanitaire* around the oil fields."⁴¹ Scorched-earth campaigns have forcibly removed groups living in contested areas, resulting in the displacement and death of many ethnic Nuer and Dinka peoples.

Rusthal Yackok, a survivor who lost his wife and six children, told reporters that he blames the Chinese government: "The Chinese wanted to drill for oil, that is why we were pushed out. Now, I have no family, no cows. I have nothing. My life is totally destroyed."⁴²

Stonewalling at the UN

China's behavior at the United Nations also fuels the continuing violence. At its meeting on July 30, 2004, the Security Council passed a motion that gave the Sudanese government 30 days to rein in the killers or be subjected to ambiguous punitive "measures." The September resolution stated: "[The Security Council] would consider taking additional measures,

including sanctions, to affect Sudan's oil sector and the Government or its individual members."⁴³ Neither these nor an equally weak resolution the following November produced much concrete improvement. The resolutions did not guarantee the provision of aid or troops, nor did they instate a no-fly zone. Furthermore, China responded to the September resolution by pledging to veto future attempts to impose an embargo. The discussions in March this year finally explored the possibility of an armed UN intervention, in which member states could 1) enforce no-fly restrictions on government or government troops or militia, and 2) ensure safety for civilians by sending reinforcements and supplies to the 2,000 African Union peacekeepers currently on the ground. An intervention of this type, unlike the piecemeal sanctioning of individual officials or the problematic ICC route,⁴⁴ would have given the UN substantial power to impose peace in Darfur. The resolutions that ultimately passed, however, did not include armed intervention, thanks in large part to China's efforts to preserve its trade ties with Sudan.

China has continued to dilute the resolutions by threatening its veto. Wang Guangya, China's representative to the UN, stated, "Sanctions or the threat of sanctions are difficult for my government," adding that "a good prescription . . . will help the patient, not kill the patient."⁴⁵ In statements following the September vote, Wang explained, "The council should ensure that the threat of sanctions would not be automatically invoked. China [is] against the use of sanctions, which it



A Chinese-built refinery in Khartoum. Photo: AP Wide World Photos

believe[s] could complicate matters.”⁴⁶ While China has not yet used its veto power on Sudan, it has abstained from several of the resolutions,⁴⁷ and Wang maintained an anti-sanctions stance throughout the proceedings.

Brothers in arms

Chinese officials seem unmindful of their own complicity in the Darfur crisis. When questioned about Sudan’s human rights abuses, Trade Ministry official Li Xiaobing merely said, “We import from every source we can get oil from.”⁴⁸ Chinese diplomats often refer to a common colonial past in rationalizing Sino-African cooperation. Liu Guijin, the Chinese ambassador to South Africa, observed in a press interview, “China and Africa shared similar experiences, both suffered from aggression, plunder and enslavement by colonialists.”⁴⁹ Journalist Peter Goodman sees the colonial aspect of China’s involvement somewhat differently: “[J]ust as colonial powers once supplied African chieftains the military means to maintain control as they extracted natural resources, China is propping up a rogue regime to get what it needs.”⁵⁰ Without the legal challenges or corporate-image liabilities that plague their Western counterparts, Chinese firms are drilling into unstable regions and extracting much-coveted resources. Rather than holding Sudan to standards of transparency, good governance or human rights, China merely requires that it adhere to the one-China policy by refusing diplomatic recognition to Taiwan.

Moreover, China maintains an immovable stance on the primacy of state sovereignty that is consistent with its objections to scrutiny of its own human rights record. In an official statement concerning human rights, Beijing berated any state that interferes “in the internal affairs of other countries on the pretext of human rights.”⁵¹

Through its oil involvement, China is responsible in four ways for continuing the violence in Sudan. First, its willingness to invest in Sudan’s oil development resulted in scorched-earth campaigns that forcibly displaced civilians from their tribal lands. Second, Chinese development of infrastructure enabled the production of oil, the revenue from which generated a larger military budget for the government. Channeled toward salary payments and weapons purchases, oil profits are prolonging the Darfur genocide. Third, Beijing is a primary supplier of arms, fighter jets and other military supplies to Khartoum. When this cozy relationship was threatened by growing international awareness of the Sudanese government’s abuses, China made its fourth contribution to violence in Sudan by brandishing its veto power, which stripped each resolution of effective action to end the violence.

In its November report, Amnesty International revealed that growing oil revenues assure the Sudanese government of its capacity for war by maintaining salary payments and financing equipment acquisition.⁵² “Khartoum is emboldened and encouraged by China’s assistance. It is using petrodollars to manufacture arms, many of them knockoff versions of Chinese weapons,” said Jemera Rone, senior researcher at Human Rights Watch.⁵³

Is peace likely?

With its actions in Sudan and at the UN, Beijing has demonstrated that while reputation may be significant, energy security is essential. Still, one expert is hopeful that consensus remains a possibility. Drew Thompson, a researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., believes that Africa could be an opportunity for cooperation between China and the United States, as well as with the international community. Thompson explains, “The U.S. could see China as a competitor, threatening its influence and access to markets and resources, or it could see China as a partner to help solve outstanding security threats.”⁵⁴ The signs, however, are not reassuring. Pressures on the Sudanese government have yielded few results, and it is unlikely that China will change its stance at the UN. China’s intransigence is based on a well-founded assumption that peace in Sudan would directly harm Chinese oil interests. Peace, with a regime change, would lead to greater IMF and World Bank control of Sudan’s oil fields, making it likely that Western companies would rejoin the competition in Sudan. Moreover, China’s financing of government such as Sudan’s thwarts the U.S. government’s promotion of democracy on the African continent. The Darfur resolutions mark the first time in recent years that Beijing has threatened its veto power against a U.S. petition supported by the United Kingdom and France. With an ally like China, Sudan has little incentive to cater to Western demands. As a result, Darfurians have become the tragic victims of China’s “peaceful rise” as a world power.

1. Sara (Meg) Davis made contributions and edits to this article.
2. John Murphy, “Africa, China forging link; the continent has the resources; Beijing has the products to trade,” *The Baltimore Sun*, November 23, 2004, 1A.
3. People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “China and Sudan,” August 25, 2003, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjw/zjg/xybfs/gjlb/2883/t16425.htm>.
4. With the first China-Africa Cooperation Forum in 2000, China established a system for facilitating diplomatic relations, trade and investment with African countries. A spokesperson with China’s Ministry of Commerce revealed that China is open to the establishment of free trade areas (FTA) with African countries. In the first nine months of 2004, Sino-African trade increased by 53.9 percent to \$20.5 billion. Jiang Wei, “Sino-Africa trade rises 54%,” *China Daily*, November 26, 2004, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjw/zjg/xybfs/gjlb/2883/t16425.htm>. During the same period, China-Sudan trade was up 19.5 percent on the previous year. “China’s trade with Sudan in October,” *Xinhua’s China Economic Information Service*, December 20, 2004, www.factiva.com.
5. “Homeless in Sudan’s Darfur reach 2.4 million: UN,” *Agence France Presse*, March 29, 2005, <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/MHII-6AY42U?OpenDocument&rc=1&emid=ACOS-635PJQ>. There were also 193,000 registered refugees in Chad as of March 2005. “Chad: Severe malnutrition on the rise in refugee camps,” UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200504060866.html>.
6. See UN Security Council resolutions 1547 (2004) of June 11, 2004, 1556 (2004) of July 30, 2004, and 1574 (2004) of November 19, 2004. United Nations Security Council, “Resolutions 2004,” http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions04.html.

7. "Darfur: New Atrocities as Security Council Dithers," Human Rights Watch, February 25, 2005.
8. See UN resolution 1590 (2005) of March 24, 2005, 1591 (2005) of March 29, 2005, and 1593 (2005) of March 31, 2005. United Nations Security Council, "Resolutions 2005," http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unscl_resolutions05.htm.
9. Energy Information Administration, "China Country Analysis Brief," United States Department of Energy, July 2004, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/china.pdf>.
10. "Energy demand growth rate to slow down," China Daily, December 15, 2004, http://service.china.org.cn/link/wcm/Show_Text?info_id=114953&p_qry=oil%20and%20consumption.
11. Brian Bremner, "Asia's great oil hunt," BusinessWeek, November 15, 2004, 60.
12. EIA, July 2004.
13. Chevron left in 1990 following the intensification of violence after the 1989 NIF coup. In August 1998 Arakis sold its share to Talisman Energy Inc., another Canadian oil company. In January 2002, Sweden's Lundin Petroleum AB announced that its operations in Sudan would be suspended due to security threats for its personnel and operations. In October 2002, Talisman bowed to pressures from the U.S. and nongovernmental organizations and sold its 25 percent GNPOC stake to India's ONGC Videsh Limited. Human Rights Watch, *Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights*, November 2003, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sudan1103/sudanprint.pdf>.
14. Mathew Forney, "Quest for Crude; the Middle Kingdom can't find enough oil to meet its booming domestic demand—and the world is paying at the pump," *TIME Magazine*, November 22, 2004, A14.
15. As of December 2004, there were several deals under consideration, initially valued at \$2 billion. Murray Smith, a former Alberta energy minister, estimates that Canada may export as much as one million barrels of oil a day to China in the future, one third of Canada's potential total exports. Simon Romero, "Not elk, but oil: China's Canada hunt," *International Herald Tribune*, December 24, 2004, 11.
16. Venezuela and China came to agreements in December 2004 that will allow China access to Venezuela's oil and natural gas fields. Chinese companies will receive rights to develop 15 oil fields and build refineries in eastern Venezuela. Chris Buckley, "China gains access to Venezuelan oil," *International Herald Tribune*, December 28, 2004, 14.
17. Saudi Arabia, the world's largest oil producer, has granted China the small boon of prospecting natural gas to sell on the domestic Saudi market. Stéphanie Giry, "China's Africa Strategy; Out of Beijing," *The New Republic*, November 15, 2004, 22.
18. Giry, 22.
19. Roger Diwan, "Sudan: Potential Impact of Sanctions," PFC Energy presentation, November 4, 2004.
20. Stephen Glain, "Yet another great game; Beijing's aggressive petrodplomacy in Africa has put it on a collision course with Washington," *Newsweek* (Atlantic Edition), December 20, 2004, 24.
21. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "China and Sudan," August 25, 2003, www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjw/zjg/xybfs/gjlb/2883/t16425.htm.
22. GNPOC is held by the following companies: India's ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL)-25 percent, equity stake, China National Petroleum Company-40 percent, Petronas Carigali Overseas of Malaysia-30 percent, and Sudan National Oil Company-five percent. Shirish Nadkarni, "ONGC expects natural gas output to double with new project," *Lloyd's List*, December 7, 2004, 6.
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24. *Ibid.*
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26. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, August 25, 2003.
27. HRW report, November 2003.
28. Ian Johnson, "China takes long view in oil projects," *The Asian Wall Street Journal*, December 16, 1999, 2.
29. *Ibid.*
30. "China's CNPC starts up new oilfield in Sudan," Reuters News, November 18, 2004.
31. Interview with Sudanese Energy Minister Awad Ahmad al-Jaz, found at: Muhammad Abu-Hasbu, "Sudan hopes to boost oil production to 500,000 bpd in 2005," *Sudan Tribune*, November 30, 2003, www.sudantribune.com/article_impr.php3?id_article=1011.
32. Howard French, "A resource-hungry China speeds trade with Africa," *International Herald Tribune*, August 9, 2004.
33. *Ibid.*, sec.9.2.
34. Amnesty International, "Sudan: Arming the perpetrators of grave abuses in Darfur," November 15, 2004, <http://www.amnestyusa.org/business/document.do?id=6F4D69DB52CBDDDD80256F3F00581BD7>.
35. AI report, sec.9.1, November 15, 2004.
36. Arvind Ganesan, e-mail correspondence, March 2, 2005.
37. *Ibid.*, sec.4.4. A Human Rights Watch researcher counted five Chinese-made T-59 tanks, eight Chinese howitzers, and one Chinese 37mm anti-aircraft gun in just one town (HRW report, November 2003).
38. AI report, sec.6.3.
39. *Ibid.*
40. The Rift Valley Institute is a Nairobi-based research group with a focus in East Africa. Goodman, A01.
41. Peter S. Goodman, "China invests heavily in Sudan's oil industry; Beijing supplies arms used on villagers," *The Washington Post*, December 23, 2004, A01.
42. *Ibid.*
43. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1574 of September 18, 2004, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/616/89/PDF/N0461689.pdf?OpenElement>.
44. Under UN Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005) of March 31, 2005, the ICC can prosecute individuals in relation to the situation in Darfur. Without an armed intervention, however, it is unlikely that the criminals will be rounded up. The court can prepare to try Sudan's war criminals in absentia, but is unable to deliver real justice without having them in custody.
45. Warren Hoge, "U.S. softens oil threat for Sudan; Move aims to secure backing for UN pact," *The New York Times*, September 16, 2004, 1R.
46. UN Security Council Press Release SC/8191, September 18, 2004, www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8191.doc.htm.
47. See UN resolutions 1556 (2004) of July 30, 2004, 1574 (2004) of September 18, 2004, 1590 (2005) of March 24, 2005, 1591 (2005) of March 29, 2005, and 1593 (2005) of March 31, 2005.
48. French, 2.
49. "Quiet superpower seduces Africa," *All Africa* (AFNWS), November 30, 2004.
50. Goodman, A01.
51. Information Office of the State Council, White Paper: "Active Participation in International Human Rights Activities," (Beijing, 1991).
52. AI report, November 15, 2004.
53. Glain, 24.
54. Drew Thompson, "A gathering consensus on Sudan?," *South China Morning Post*, 18 November 2004, 17.